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Introduction
Three young men enter a shopping mall. In a security office in the mall a guard monitors
them via closed circuit TV. Based upon their appearance (i.e their ethnicity, the way they are
dressed etc.) he decides to approach them and asks for ID. They are told that if they do not produce
ID, they will not be admitted. He then runs their names through the computer and finds that one of
them was arrested two years before on a shop lifting charge. He tells all three they must leave.
This not uncommon scenario raises nettlesome issues regarding the general right of the mall
owner to exclude versus the right of the young men to visit the mall, as well as whether the
exclusion was based upon factors, such as race, age or ethnicity, that many would find at minimum
troubling and perhaps entirely unacceptable.1 The owner of the shopping mall would likely claim
that he need not explain his or her reasons for excluding these men because the mall is private
property and as the owner retains discretion to exclude anyone for any reason or no reason at all.
The young men might counter that the shopping mall is effectively a public space since it is the only
place in the vicinity that offers any shopping, entertainment, services and dining and has replaced
the local downtown as the primary place to walk around and interact with others in the vicinity.
They might also assert that the mall owner’s criteria for exclusion included illegitimate factors such
as the young men’s age, race or ethnicity. This type of scenario has resulted in a lively scholarly
debate as well as a fair amount of litigation.2
1

See, e.g., Anne-Marie G. Harris, Shopping While Black, Applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to the Cases of Consumer Racial
Profiling, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1 (2003); Joesph Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and
Private Property, 90 NW. U.L. REV. 1283 (1996); Patricia J. Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse
of Fingerpointing as the Law’s Response to Racism, 42 U. Miami L. Rev. 127 (1987); Amy Benfer, ”Policing Gangsta
Fashion” Salon (May 29, 2002); Judith Evans, “Eddie Bauer’s Tarnished Local Image: As Its Fashions Become
Popular with Urban Youth, Retailer Deals with the Fallout of P.G., Incident, Wash. Post (Dec. 30, 1995); Courtland
Milloy “Teen Stripped of More than Just a Shirt” Wash. Post (Nov. 15, 1995).
2

See, e.g., Andrew von Hirsch & Clifford Shearing, Exclusion from Public Space, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL
PERSPECTIVES ON SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION 77, 79, 86 (Andrew von Hirsch, David Garland & Alison
Wakefield eds. 2001) (“[I]t suffices that we treat as public in character those spaces that clearly are designed for
general public use, such as a large downtown shopping mall replacing a traditional shopping area.); Singer, supra note
2 at 1291 (“Both public perception and fundamental legal principles today suggest that businesses open to the public
have a duty to serve the public without unjust discrimination. Yet the formal law does not unequivocally reflect this
principle. I will argue here that the formal law should reflect the settled social consensus behind this principle, and that,
in order to do so, the common-law rule that grants most businesses the right to exclude customers at will must be
changed.”); Richard Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy of PruneYard v. Robbins, 64 U. CHI. L. REV.
21, 24 (1997) (“The power of government to regulate and to take is closely tied to the correlative rights and duties of
ordinary individuals as regulated and determined in common law adjudication. This position does not require us to
pretend that each and every common law decision is part of some seamless intellectual web. Obviously, some strong
differences of opinion persist regarding the application of general common law principles to particular cases or even
entire classes of problems.”); Sarah G. Vincent, The Cultural Context of the Shopping Mall: Tension between Patron’s
Right of Access & Owner’s Right to Exclude, 37 U. WEST. L.A. L. REV. 221, 222 (2004) (“Which is more important: a
protester's First Amendment rights or a private property owner's right to exclude? There are a series of shopping mall
cases in which the courts decide whether or not protestors can use shopping malls to disseminate information to the
public against private property owners' wishes. I want to use the shopping mall as an example of how new forms of
private property were addressed by the courts and whether or not that resolution was satisfactory. I believe we can learn
from the shopping mall cases so we do not repeat the same mistakes in future controversies involving new forms of
property…Then there is a disagreement between the people who use the space and those who created it. A question
arises: who resolves this disagreement? May an owner make up the rules after the game has started or are the rules
implicit in the way that the owner invites people to play the game and how the people have begun to play it?”);
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The technique used to exclude these men is often referred to as situational crime prevention
(SCP) and shopping malls fall into a class of property called mass private space.3 The extent and
manner of states’ regulation of owners of mass private property (e.g shopping malls and amusement
parks) in their employment of situational crime prevention (“SCP”) (e.g. exclusion of certain
groups, surveillance with video cameras) challenges traditional notions of property law and the
states’ exercise of police power. The de jure private status of the property supports the argument
that owner should be free to employ whatever methods of SCP (short of criminal acts such as
assault and false imprisonment) that the owner deems to be in his or her self interest4; the de facto
public nature of the property, however, counsels in favor of allowing the state to regulate the actions
that the owner takes on the property vis-à-vis members (such as excluding those who fit a certain
profile) pursuant to the state’s inherent police power.5 Although courts and commentators have
grappled with the issue of the extent to which the owners of shopping malls and the like should be
able to employ exclusion, surveillance or other tactics to reduce crime or other undesirable activities
as a matter of their own prerogative, free from legislative or judicial interference, there has been
little consensus.6
The current article puts forth two main critiques with regard to the current approach and
through such critique provides an alternative approach. First, it posits that current scholarship and
doctrine errs by treating mass private property either as if it were the same as other private property
or as if it were public space, thus ignoring the dual nature of mass private property as being both
public and private.7 Second, this article argues that most cases and articles that have addressed the
issue of SCP by owners of mass private property, ignore the role that such properties play in a given
community, analyzing the issue as if the property existed in a vacuum, divorced from the city,
neighborhood or area in which it is located and the role that a given property plays in a particular
locale (what will hereinafter be referred to as the community contingent nature of mass private
Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 325 (1968) (“Logan Valley
Mall is the functional equivalent of a ‘business block’ and. . . must be treated in substantially the same manner.”); State
v. Schmid 423 A.2d 615, 628 (NJ 1980) (effectively treating mass private space as public for free speech purposes; N.J.
Coalition Against War in the Middle E. v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 760 (NJ 1994) (same); Citizens for
Ethical Government, Inc. v. Gwinnett Place Assoc., L.P., 260 Ga. 245, 246 (GA 1990). (“The property at issue here is a
privately owned and operated shopping mall that is generally open to the public for shopping, dining and entertainment.
Since the mall's opening, its owners have enforced a policy prohibiting all solicitation and political activity in the mall.
The policy has been applied uniformly to all persons and organizations without regard to the content or format. We hold
that nothing in the Georgia Constitution or the Recall Act of 1989, either separately or together, establishes a right of
private citizens to enter onto such property to solicit signatures for a recall petition.”).
3
4

These terms will be more formally defined in section I of this article
Epstein, supra note 2, at 24.

5

See Pruneyard Shopping Cntr. v. Robins 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (”It is, of course, well established that a state in the
exercise of its police power may adopt reasonable restrictions on private property . . . . “); Singer, supra note 2, at 1291.

6

Compare Epstein supra note 2 (arguing that “it is difficult to conceive of any property as private if the right to
exclude is rejected” with Singer, supra note 2 (asserting that “the common-law rule that grants most businesses the right
to exclude at will must be changed.”; see also Prueyard, 447 U.S at 81; Lucia Zedner, Too Much Security, INT. J. OF
THE SOC. OF LAW (2003); Jennifer Klear, Comparison of the Federal Courts’ and the New Jersey Supreme Court’s
Treatment of Free Speech on Private Property: Where Won’t We Have the Freedom to Speak Next?, 33 RUTGERS L.J.
589 (2002).
7

See, e.g., Singer, supra note 2; Epstein, supra note 2; von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2; section III, infra.
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property). In so doing, these cases and articles fail to recognize that the manner in which SCP is to
be regulated (if at all) should depend not only upon the nature of the property itself but the
characteristics of the setting wherein the property is located, which necessarily has a two-way
symbiotic relationship with the property.8 In response to the failure of current scholarship and case
law with regard to the above issues, the instant article seeks to establish a framework for regulating
SCP in mass private property that incorporates both the dual nature of mass private property and
community contingency.
Section I defines mass private property and SCP with some more detail and examples than
the rather general description put forth here in the introduction. Section II summarizes some
prominent literature and case law that seeks to address the conundrum posed by SCP in mass
private property. Section III discusses the dual nature of mass property, as both private property
and as public milieu, and posits that the private and public features of mass private property are
separate aspects and that, however challenging, the best approach to regulating SCP on such
property lies in recognizing and taking account of each of these characteristics.
Section IV discusses the contingent nature of mass private property, asserting that such
spaces play different roles in different communities. Because the meaning of community is a
contested concept, the section opens with a discussion of some arguments put forth about the
meaning of “community.” This article does not seek to resolve the problem of defining community
for all purposes, but, less ambitiously, seek to provide a provisional definition of community that is
sufficient for the purposes for evaluating the role of a particular mass private space in a given
community. The relationship between community and regulation of mass private property is twofold. First, the type of SCP that is acceptable is partly a function of the role that a given mass
private property plays in a community. Second, the degree of freedom that an owner of such
property has to regulate conduct in his or her space raises questions regarding the values of the
community in which it is situated. Just as punishment, among other things, expresses the values of
the society that undertakes the punishment,9 the forms of SCP that a community allows or prohibits
in mass private space is also expressive of community values since such space plays a public role in
the community.10 For this reason, this paper asserts that the community wherein the mass private

8

James Bernard Murphy, Equality in Exchange, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 85, 113 (2002) (“Both Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas
understand property ownership as a kind of trust: civil law permits private ownership on the condition that it serve the
common good of the community. Each property owner is a kind of trustee who has a duty of justice to ensure that his
property meets the needs of his fellow citizens. According to the principle of subsidiarity implicit in their thought, it
would be unjust for the government to claim sole responsibility for distributive justice, for this would deny individuals
and communities the right to exercise their best judgment and creative initiative in deciding how their wealth could best
serve the common good.”).
9

EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOUR IN SOCIETY 79-80 (1960) (“In modern societies, in contrast, with moral
values that celebrate individual freedom and rationality, acts that violate the moral order do not produce as strong a
demand for punishment and punishments reflect those values by emphasizing the humanity of even the offender.”);
Ronald J. Rychlak, Society’s Moral Right to Punish: A Further Exploration of the Denunciation Theory of Punishment,
65 TUL. L. REV. 299, 306 (1990) (“The law-abiding public, through its legislatures, has structured the criminal law
system to reflect its values and beliefs.”).
10

See Mark C. Alexander, Attention, Shoppers: The First Amendment in the Modern Shopping Mall, 1999 Ariz. L.
Rev. 1, 2 (1999) (“Countless Americans practically live their lives in the modern mall. . . . In the late 1960s and the
1970s, the shopping mall had already developed into a significant American institution, but in the intervening decades,
malls like the Mall of America in Minnesota, the Sawgrass Mills mall in Florida and many others have literally and
figuratively redefined the American landscape.”).
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space is located should, within certain boundaries, be given broad leeway to regulate SCP in such
space.
Section V sets forth a framework for regulating SCP in mass private property that is rooted
in both the dual public/private nature of mass private property discussed in
Section III, and the argument put forth in Section IV that the role that a private space plays in a
given community is geographically and demographically variable, and that regulating SCP in mass
private property is an important means by which a community can express itself. In sum, Section V
argues that the dual public/private nature of mass private property imposes substantive boundaries
upon the community, on one hand, delineating a zone of protection for mass private property
owners by providing some limit on the community’s putting restrictions upon the SCP measures the
owner may employ, and on the other hand providing a limit as to the SCP measures that a mass
private property owner may implement, even if authorized to do so by the community. Within these
boundaries, the community should (with some exceptions discussed in Section V) be the arbiter of
which SCP measures the owner may employ.
I.
Mass Private Property and Situational Crime Control Defined
A.

Mass Private Property

Mass private property is a “term coined by Shearing and Stenning to describe large,
privately-controlled tracts of property.”11 Although originally discussed primarily in non-US
sources, the term has now frequently been used in American scholarly literature.12 It is sometimes
called “mass private space,” “semi-public space,” or “quasi-public space.” To understand what
constitutes mass private property, it is important to realize that the term refers not only to the size of
the property, but also to its use: it “performs the function of public space.”13
The paradigmatic mass private property is the large shopping mall that contains retail stores,
restaurants, theaters and other entertainment centers, as well as common areas that people often
frequent or walk around much like they would in an urban shopping district.14 However, there is no
11

Alison Wakefield, Situational Crime Prevention in Mass Private Property, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON
SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION, supra note 2, at 125 n. 1; see also von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 86.
12

See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, Conceptualizing the Private Police, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 573, 591 (2005) (“The term
“mass private property” coined by Shearing and Stenning, refers to large, privately owned spaces like shopping malls,
gated communities, and commercial and industrial “campuses” that depend upon public use.”).

13
See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (“The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for
use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of
those who use it.”); see also Pruneyard Shopping Center, 447 U.S. 74 (holding that California’s requiring a shopping
mall to allow expressive activity in the mall was not a taking within the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment given the nature of the activity in relation to the primary purpose to which the owner of the mall had put
the property).
14

Wakefield, supra note 11, at 125; see also Curtis J. Berger, PruneYard Revisited: Political Activity on Private Lands,
66 N.Y.U.L. REV. 633, 656 (1991) (“Where it is important legally to distinguish between private and public space, as
must be done in the search for a public forum, one should look beyond the property's title, focusing instead on its
physical layout, its ongoing activity, and the occupants' reasonable expectations. Political discourse naturally
complements the medley of ongoing activity within the marketplace. As the American city evolved, the market
expanded into the streets and sidewalks of the central business district. More recently, as suburban America developed,
the privately owned mall has transformed the marketplace once again. Each stage of evolution, from a discrete public
marketplace to the expanded central business district to the privately owned mall, has embodied attributes that well suit
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precise line demarcating the boundary between mass private space and other forms of private
property, the matter being a matter of degree as well as a dynamic concept that continues to
evolve.15 Perhaps the best way to determine what one should consider to be mass private property
is the degree to which the property resembles and function as public space.16 So while the large
shopping mall is the paradigm, mass private property might included such spaces as “an arts centre.
. .with visual and performing arts and licensed refreshment facilities” and a large shopping center
that consisted mainly of retail shops but did not contain all the entities that one might find in a
shopping mall, such as cinemas, restaurants or other entertainment facilities.17
The key distinguishing feature is that the private property is open to the public for multiple
uses and even for no particular use. Thus, many users of mass private property will go there to
simply walk around or to socialize and not necessary to purchase anything.18 Moreover, generally
the owners/operators of such properties allow people to access these spaces without requiring them
to purchase anything.
Thus, mass private spaces are distinguishable from other private spaces that are open to the
public for a particular use, such as shops, restaurants and cinemas.19 The public can generally enter
the forum role. Thus, it seems natural to define the modern public forum not in terms of ownership but rather as a
gathering place . . . .”).
15
See Berger, supra note 14, at 656.
16

See Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 86; see also New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v.
J.M.B Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 781 (N.J. 1994) (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 581, n. 5 (Marshall,
J., dissenting)) (“We realize there may be differences of degree and that some cases might approach a closeness that
would otherwise give us pause. Similar concerns apparently infused the debate among Justices of the United States
Supreme Court on these issues. Addressing precisely the same concerns expressed by defendants, Justice Marshall said:
‘Every member of the Court was acutely aware [in Logan] that we were dealing with degrees, not absolutes. But we
found that degrees of difference can be of constitutional dimension.’ Despite the degrees, the entity to which we apply
the free speech right, the regional shopping center, is clearly and easily discernible and distinguishable from all others in
its constitutional satisfaction of the standard of Schmid; it is distinguishable in its physical size, its multitude of uses, its
layout, and its combination of characteristics that together compel the imposition of the constitutional obligation.”).
17

Wakefield, supra note 11, at 125; see also von Hirsch and Shearing, supra note 2, at 86 (“At one end of the spectrum
lie facilities that are primarily designed for specific uses—say, a small atrium in front of a few shops, meant for the
convenience of customers but not for general use. At the other end, is the large shopping mall which contains numerous
retail outlets, restaurants, recreational facilities, and parking spaces—and which is meant for general public use.”);
Brian Libby, Shopping Around for Second Lives, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2003, (2003) (“[M]alls gather a variety of goods
into a central cluster [and] to have an ongoing life: malls need to take on more uses: social services, housing, religious
institutions.” (internal quotes omitted)).
18

See von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 86 (discussing the stereotype of teenagers spending leisure time at the
mall is an example of the “no particular use” aspect of such property); M. Neil Browne, Virginia Morrison & Kara Jo
Jennings, The Role of Ethics in Regulatory Discourse: Can Market Failure Justify the Regulation of Casino Gambling?,
78 NEB. L. REV. 37, 62 (1999) (“Also alarming is that young adults are spending more time in malls than any prior
generation. Dr. James Roberts, assistant professor of marketing at Baylor University, comments that shopping centers
are becoming hangout places where adolescents seek entertainment and socialization among friends.”); Jerry Kang &
Dana Cuff, Pervasive Computing: Embedding the Public Sphere, 62 WASH & LEE L. REV. 93, 131 (2005) (“In addition
to the manifest function of a shopping mall--namely shopping--the mall serves myriad latent functions, ranging from
adolescent socializing to senior citizen physical exercise. As any urban teenager can testify, the mall is a prime site for
dating, hanging out, and meeting new friends.”); Vincent, supra note 2, at 221 (“The shopping mall is the cathedral of
contemporary culture. It is the focus of what little social life many of us share with others.”).
19

Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 86 (“[T]he mass private property concept identifies a change in the structure
of modern life—where and how Americans live, work, and spend leisure time—that has led to a more prominent role
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such places but only for a particular use and a limited time. Certainly some shops allow people to
browse for various periods of time, and department stores are probably on the border of what might
be considered mass private space, as they often have many departments and are set up to encourage
people to wander from department to department.20
For the purposes of the framework put forth here it is not necessary to delineate the exact
line that demarcates mass private property and other private property, and locating the exact point at
which private space has sufficient public use to qualify as mass private property would be difficult
if not impossible.21 For this analysis, what I wish to convey is a sense of the type of properties that
qualify as mass private space. Moreover, for purposes of the framework I propose, one can assume
that the property in question is at the end of the spectrum closest to public property, such as a mall
with shops, restaurants, services, entertainment facilities and other attributes that one would find in
a typical public commercial district, because such property raises the most difficult issues as regards
SCP. By providing an analysis with reference primarily to such property (although with some
degree of acknowledgement of “less massive” and “less public” mass private space), this article
develops a framework applicable to various types of mass private space.
B.

Situational Crime Prevention

Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) is a term most associated with the British criminologist
Ronald Clarke, who notes that while SCP “has come to mean differing things . . . .[I]n its broad[est]
meaning, it encompasses any attempt to manipulate the environment to reduce opportunities for
crime.”22 Like mass private property, the concept and terminology has made its way into American
scholarship.23 Less abstractly, SCP (sometimes referred to as primary crime prevention or

for private police.”); Elizabeth Joh, Criminal Law: The Paradox of Private Policing 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49,
63-64.
20

Additionally, there are some places that charge admission that might be considered mass private space, such as
amusement parks. The analysis in this paper will focus on mass private property that one may enter free of charge.
Nonetheless, to the extent that a property that charges an entry fee has aspects of mass private property, my analysis
applies.

21

Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 86. Richard Epstein picks up on this problem, suggesting that the point at
which private property becomes subject to public considerations is marked not by any quality inherent in the property
itself, but rather in the way a particular court is going to evaluate it. Epstein supra note 2, at 34-35. Furthermore,
Michael Heller notes that “[p]rivate property is a complicated idea to pin down precisely, as its boundaries fray at the
edges.” Michael A. Heller, Critical Approaches to Property Institutions: Three Faces of Private Property, 79 Or. L.
Rev. 417, 418 (2000).
22

Ronald Clarke, Situation Prevention, Criminology and Social Values, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON
SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION, at 97, 99.
23

See, e.g., Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 N.W. L. REV. 655, 662
(2006) (“Situational Crime Prevention (‘SCP’) arose out of a growing realization in the 1970s and 1980s that changes in
policing and punishment were failing to reduce crime levels.”); Richard H. Schneider, American Anti-Terrorism
Planning and Design Strategies: Applications for Florida Growth Management, Comprehensive Planning and Urban
Design, 15 J. LAW & PUB. POL’Y., 129, 138 (2003) (“Articulated by Ronald V. Clarke from ideas developed while he
was at the British home office in the 1960s and early 1970s, situational crime prevention suggests that effective crime
prevention depends upon opportunity reduction. This can be accomplished by increasing the perpetrator's risk of being
seen or apprehended, by increasing the effort required to commit a criminal act, or by decreasing the rewards of the act.
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reduction) describes steps taken to prevent (or more realistically reduce) crime before it occurs by
reducing opportunities.24 This stands in contrast to traditional crime control, which seeks to reduce
crime through the deterrent and incapacitating effects of punishment, or by addressing the social
and economic causes of crime.25
SCP includes measures such as designing cars with steering locks and closing off roads in
high crime areas to make it harder for potential offenders to get into and out of such areas.26 It also
includes providing better street lighting at night, outfitting merchandise with tags that trigger an
alarm if one tries to remove the item from a shop without paying, and the installation of CCTV
cameras in shops or in public places.27 Some SCP comes in the form of advice to individuals to
take certain steps to reduce their risks of being crime victims, such as not walking alone at night or
avoiding certain neighborhoods.28
To foreshadow an issue that will be addressed in subsequent sections, SCP involves both an
objective element (reducing crime) and a subjective one (making people feel safer), which may not
be directly correlated with each other.29 In fact, as Zedner has argued, some SCP measures that
seek to reduce crime may increase people’s anxiety about crime by raising their awareness of risk.30
According to the theory, any one of these factors may be sufficient in and of themselves to deter or prevent criminal (or,
by extension, terrorist) acts.”).
24

See Ken Pease, Crime Reduction, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 947, 950 (Mike Maguire, Rod
Morgan & Robert Reiner eds., 2002).
25

See id. at 948-49.

26

See R. A. Duff & S. E. Marshall, Benefits, Burdens and Responsibilities: Some Ethical Dimensions of Situational
Crime Prevention, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION, at 17; see also Cheng,
supra note 23, at 662 (citing steel mailboxes as an example of SCP in that the design of the box itself encourages a
default pattern of behavior in which people do not steal mail); Ellen M. Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules: Rape Victims
and Comparative Fault, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1454 (Oct. 1999) (“For example, studies have found that the
presence of two cashiers greatly reduced the incidence of convenience store robberies. In some cases, even simple
measures such as increased exterior lighting have been effective in reducing crime and the fear of crime in particular
areas.”).
27

See Pease, supra note 24, at 953; Martha J. Smith and Ronald V. Clarke, Crime and Public Transport, 27 CRIME &
JUST. 169, 171 (2000) (“Increased supervision would deter many offenders anxious to avoid detection and arrest. This
can be accomplished through the use of more conductors and station staff, and by the provision of closed-circuit
television (CCTV) surveillance.”).
28
See Duff & Marshall, supra note 23, at 27, 31; Allison West, Tougher Prosecution When the Rapist is not a Stranger:
Suggested Reform to the California Penal Code, 24 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 169, 179 (Spring 1994) (“The fear of rape
has been described as one that "most women experience . . . a nagging, gnawing sense that something awful could
happen, an angst that keeps them from doing things they want or need to do, or from doing them at the time or in the
way they might otherwise do." Women share this fear in many unspoken ways: looking in the back seat of a car before
entering alone, avoiding walking alone on a dark street, and checking out the surroundings when going somewhere
new.”).
29

See Zedner, supra note 6, at 15; Wendy Holloway & Tony Jefferson, The Role of Anxiety in Fear of Crime, in CRIME,
RISK AND INSECURITY 31 (Tim Hope & Richard Sparks eds., 2000); compare David Weisburd and John Eck, What Can
Police Do to Reduce Crime, Disorder, and Fear?, 593 ANNALS 42, 56 (May 2004) (“Evidence of the effectiveness of
situational and opportunity-blocking strategies, while not necessarily police based, provides indirect support for the
effectiveness of problem solving in reducing crime and disorder.”), with Smith and Clarke, supra note 27, at 204-05
(2000) (“Those responsible for security on public transportation systems can be seen as having two principal goals: to
make the system as safe as possible by reducing levels of crime and to make passengers feel safer when riding their
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As regards mass private property, the two primary SCP issues with which the instant article
is are: (1) exclusion from such spaces; (2) behavioral standards. In a sense these are just different
flavors of the same strategy. Exclusion is often based on behavior in which one has previously
engaged at the property in question.31 And behavioral standards are generally enforced by
removing (and thereby excluding at least temporarily) those who refuse to abide by the behavioral
standards.32
SCP in mass private property may involve several types of exclusion and behavioral
standards. Exclusion from a space may be “permanent or of substantial duration,”33 or the
exclusion may be brief, such as asking someone who has behaved in a way unacceptable to the
owner/operator to leave the premises and not return for the rest of the day or until he ceases
“engaging in the behavior.”34

systems. Several studies have found that fear of crime is related to personal and vicarious experience of crime or to
feelings of personal vulnerability . . . . It might seem therefore that achieving the first goal would help achieve the
second. However, as in other environments, the relationship between actual safety and fear of crime on public transport
is not always direct.”).
30

See id.

31

See Wakefield, supra note 11, at 132-33; von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 92; Gregory Magarian, The First
Amendment, the Public-Private Distinction, and Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime Political Debate, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 101, 121 (November 2004) (“During the campaign against international terrorism, numerous property
owners of this sort have clamped down on political debate, barring critics of government policies from channels of
expression opened by their own invitations for the public to use their property. The most emblematic incidents involved
the expulsion of lone, peaceful protesters from spaces frequented by the public. Stephen Downs's arrest at the
Crossgates Mall followed an incident a few months earlier in which the same mall had called the police to expel several
local peace activists who had taped antiwar messages to their clothing and entered the mall.”).
32

See id. at 132; See also IRA G. ZEPP, JR. THE NEW RELIGIOUS IMAGE OF URBAN AMERICA: THE SHOPPING MALL AS
CEREMONIAL CENTER 171 (1986) (“When the number of teens reaches critical mass and their behavior, especially
excessive noise and the blocking of store entrances, has reached unacceptable levels, security is called. At the extreme,
security personnel or police will ban the young perpetrators from the mall. For many teenagers, to be shunned by the
mall and thereby isolated from their peers is a fate worse than death. This has proved to be an effective deterrent.”);
Skirt Stake, MIAMI NEW TIMES, August 4, 2005 (“Although tight, revealing garb and Burberry tams are venerated as
South Florida cultural standards, Lior Gonda, a Web designer from Weston, was asked to leave a popular mall because
he was wearing a demure floor-dusting skirt.”); Amy Benfer, Policing Gangsta Fashion, May 24, 2006,
http://dir.salon.com/story/mwt/feature/2002/05/29/nelly/index.html (“In late April, the rap star Nelly entered the Union
Station Mall in his hometown of St. Louis to purchase 20 Cardinals jerseys for a video he was shooting at Busch
stadium. Nelly (given name, Cornelius Haynes Jr.) is a local celebrity whose presence is usually welcomed. But on this
day he was asked to leave by the Union Station security staff. The reason? He was wearing a do-rag, which is explicitly
prohibited under the Union Station dress code as an item of "commonly known gang-related paraphernalia"—a category
the mall defines as "including, but not limited to: wearing or showing a bandana or do rag of any color, a hat tilted or
turned to the side, a single sleeve or pant leg pulled/rolled up and flashing gang signs . . . . But in this mall, as in many
others across America, one doesn't have to be a gang member to be evicted under anti-gang ordinances; one merely has
to dress in a way that makes one look like a gang member, as defined by the mall in question.").
33

Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 88.

34

Id. at 92; see also Wakefield, supra note 11, at 134.
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The basis for exclusion and the extent that such is employed varies from one mass private
space to another.35 As already mentioned, the owner of the private space might exclude a person
based upon his or her behavior at that particular moment.36 Additionally, an owner of mass private
property might attempt to ban persons convicted of criminal offenses (either committed in that
particular space or elsewhere).37 Further, and most controversially, SCP in mass private space may
take the form of excluding persons who fit a particular profile.38 Thus, security guards may exclude
people “whose behavior or body language is perceived as suspicious [or] who seem out of place in
relation to the area or time of day.”39 Moreover, security guards might exclude persons who fit a
particular demographic or social circumstance, such as young people or the homeless.40

35

See Wakefield, supra note 11, at 134.

36

Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 87; Wakefield, supra note 11, at 132; ZEPP, supra note 29; Josh Mulligan,
Finding a Forum in the Simulated City: Mega Malls, Gated Towns, and the Promise of PruneYard, 13 CORNELL J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 533, 534 (2004) (“However, private interests, usually corporations, control the simulated spaces—the
shopping malls, the gated communities, and the private parks. Because these simulated spaces are privately-owned and
controlled, owners regulate behavior within by exerting the most fundamental property right—the right to exclude.”).
37

See id. at 90-91; Wakefield, supra note 11, at 131-32.

38

Id; see also Wakefield, supra note 11, at 130-31; Harris, supra note 2, at 8-10 (“Consumer Racial Profiling (CRP) is
defined as any type of differential treatment of consumers in the marketplace based on race or ethnicity that constitutes
a denial or degradation in the product or service offered to the consumer. In a retail environment, CRP can take many
forms, ranging from overt or outright confrontation to very subtle differences in treatment, often manifested in forms of
harassment. Outright confrontation includes verbal attacks, such as shouting racial epithets, and physical attacks, such
as removing customers from the store. Customer harassment includes slow or rude service, required pre-payment,
surveillance, searches of belongings, and neglect, such as refusing to serve African-American customers . . . . On the
other hand, some statistical theories suggest that overt disparate treatment simply arises from a retailer's desire to
maximize profits and minimize costs, and does not reflect animus towards a particular group. A retailer who engages in
"revenue-based statistical discrimination" makes a presumption about the potential revenue he or she may receive from
different types of customers and acts accordingly . . . . Unwittingly, some retailers make assumptions about their black
customers based on stereotypes relating to the propensity of African Americans to commit crimes and their inability to
pay for goods.”).

39

Wakefield, supra note 11, at 130.

40

See id. at 130. The right of an owner of mass private property to exclude someone without having a valid basis for
such varies from the US to the UK. And, in the US, the standards are different from state to state. In the UK, the owner
of a property that is generally open to the public can exclude someone without giving any reason. CIN Properties Ltd. v.
Rawlins, [1995] 2 E.G.L.R. 130. The US Supreme Court has given states the power to decide whether property owners
may exclude persons arbitrarily, holding that one does not have a federal constitutional right to enter private property,
even if it is generally open to the public, but also holding that a state’s requiring a property owner who opens her
property to the general public to not exclude persons arbitrarily does not violate the property owner’s rights. PruneYard
Shopping Center, 447 U.S. 74; Klear, supra note 6. In light of this holding, several state supreme courts have
interpreted their respective constitutions in various ways as regards the right to exclude from mass private property. For
example, in New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757 (N.J. 1994), the
New Jersey Supreme Court held that regional shopping centers could not exclude persons wanting to hand out literature
on their property concerning policy issues but could impose reasonable restrictions upon such activity.
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Other forms of SCP, such as CCTV surveillance41 or employment of private security guards
may also take place on mass private property. However, the use of SCP techniques other than
exclusion and the imposition of behavioral standards in mass private space do not raise issues
peculiar to their use there—they raise the same type of legal, ethical and other issues when used in
mass private space as they do if used in other private or public spaces.42
II.
Current Conceptions/Theories of Regulating Situational Crime Control in Mass
Private Space.
This section provides an overview and critique of some of the arguments raised concerning
regulating SCP in mass private space. Additional critique of these arguments will inhere in the
arguments I put forth in Sections III, IV and V.
Arguments as to the authority that owners/operators of mass private property should have
with regard to SCP have generally been substantive and fixed. Such arguments thus seek to reach a
conclusion as to what techniques are appropriate on mass private property and do not take account
of the variability of relationships that may exist between mass private property and the people who
live near the property and/or would wish to frequent it.43 Moreover, the arguments do not engage
the issue of the mechanism by which decisions should be made as to what forms of SCP are
acceptable in a given mass property. And although some scholars have recognized that the quantity
and quality of SCP that one may employ might vary from person to person or place to place,44
41

Andrew von Hirsch, The Ethics of Public Television Surveillance, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON
SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION, at 59; see also Marcus Nieto, Public Video Surveillance: Is It An Effective Crime
Prevention Tool?, http://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/97/05 (last visited Aug. 9, 2006).
42

Private security guards on mass private property of course do raise issues with which this paper is concerned to the
extent that the guards are involved in excluding persons and enforcing behavioral codes. Other issues that employment
of private security raises, such as lack of training, the fact that private actors are carrying out traditionally public
functions and that a public good may end up going to the highest bidder, fall outside the scope of this paper, because
those issues, while present with regard to private security guards on mass private property, are not limited in their
employment to mass private space; these same concerns are raised with regard to private security guards employed in
other settings.

43

See, e.g. von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 87-95 (setting forth a model delineating what forms of exclusion
from mass private (and public) property are acceptable without taking account of the role that such space may play in a
given locality); Clarke, supra note 22, at 110 (putting forth a generally favorable view of SCP, bemoaning its lack of
acceptance among most academics, but failing to focus upon places and populations as important factors in determining
the costs and benefits of SCP).

44

David Garland, Ideas, Institutions and Situational Crime Prevention, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON
SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION, at 13 (“SCP also allows a form of local or even individual action that can be
undertaken directly by those fearful of crime.”); Duff & Marshall, supra note 23, at 17 (“[T]here are morally significant
differences between the groups on which SCP measures impact.”); Michael S. Scott, Community Justice in Policing, 42
IDAHO L. REV. 415, 433, 436-37 (2006) (“One dimension of the broad community justice approach is that the systems
in which offenders are adjudicated ought to take better account of the desires, needs, perspectives, and interests of the
community most directly affected by the offenders' conduct. While crime can be said to have consequences to society as
a whole, it has more immediate and tangible consequences for the smaller communities in which particular crimes occur
. . . . Just as individuals have different capacities and competences to solve problems, so too do communities. Not all
communities or community groups are equally staffed, organized, trained, resourced, connected, or skilled to push the
buttons and pull the levers of social control to bring about purposeful, significant, and lasting improvements to public
safety.”).
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existing scholarship is noticeably void of arguments addressing the issue of what role communities
in which mass private properties are located should play as arbiters of what is and is not appropriate
SCP on such properties.45 Some of these scholars have focused upon SCP (including exclusion) in
terms of mass private space,46 while others have focused on barring given members of the public
(and other SCP techniques) more generally, whether or not such occurs in mass private space or
elsewhere).47
Many commentators have formulated their analysis by explicitly or implicitly treating mass
private property as if it were purely public space or close to being public space and as such arguing
in favor of strong limits on exclusion and other forms of SCP. These include Singer, Garland, Von
Hirsch and Shearing and Duff and Marshall.
Singer argues that in contemporary society the common law rule that private business
owners generally have the right to exclude at their discretion should be changed in favor of a regime
that would take as a given that any member of the public would have the right to enter shopping
malls, retail shops, restaurants, places of entertainment and similar businesses.48 Thus, Singer does
not limit his argument regarding the use of the SCP technique of exclusion to mass private space.49
Garland, focusing on SCP primarily in the mass space setting, describes exclusion from such
spaces and other such techniques in wholly negative terms:
In these private settings (many of which are mass private spaces such as
shopping malls that happen to be privately owned and administered)
individuals may be required to submit to searches, or be monitored and
filmed, and they may be subject to exclusion without cause shown. There
is here a rough justice of exclusion and full-force surveillance that has
become more and more routine in our experience and which is
increasingly viewed as a necessary condition for securing the safety and
pleasures of consumers and decent citizens.50
Von Hirsch and Shearing, also focusing on mass private space, argue that owners/operators
of such properties should not have broad exclusionary powers since such property “performs the
45

See,. e.g., Wakefield, supra note 11, at 144 (stating that “[f]or privately-controlled territories to operate as sites for
public life, there is a need to strike a balance in the controls that are adopted, so that they may serve their local
communities effectively as local communal space” while failing to expand upon this kernel); Judy Johnson, The
Importance of Obtaining Community Support to Reduce Crime, in HANDBOOK OF LOSS PREVENTION AND CRIME
PREVENTION 599, 609 (Lawrence J. Fennelly, ed. 1982) (“If crime prevention is to be effective in improving the quality
of life, the role of the community must be expanded to include supportive efforts from a broad base of organized groups
wihin a jurisdiction.”).
46

See, e.g., id. 144 (“For privately-controlled territories to operate as sites for public life, there is a need to strike a
balance in the controls that are adopted. . . .”).
47

See, e.g., von Hirsch, supra note 38 (discussing the ethics of CCTV surveillance in mass private space and
elsewhere); John Kleinig, The Burdens of Situational Crime Prevention, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON
SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION, at 37 (noting the “tendencies. . .associated with attempts to legitimize and elevate
SCP, but which. . .lead it to overreach its capabilities.”).
48

See Singer, supra note 2, at 1291.

49

See id.

50

DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 160 (2001).
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functions of public space.”51 Although they note that SCP steps such as exclusion may serve to
reduce crime, the use of such measures “in areas having public use entails serious losses of personal
liberty.”52 They therefore conclude that a mass private space, such as “a large privately-owned mall
that invites the public to enter without specification of purpose is. . .offering a public service, and
thus may be called upon to ensure that all members of the public have proper access.”53 Therefore,
their analysis “treat[s] as public in character those spaces that clearly are designed for general public
use.”54
51

See also Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, 773 P.2d 1294, 1300 (Or. 1989) (“Shopping malls have become part of American
life. Large numbers of the public gather there. Although plaintiff tries to cloak a public mall as a private place, it is the
antithesis of a private place.”); Alexander, supra note 10, at 44 (1999) (“[T]he modern mall is the new downtown . . . .
[T]he malls of today have replaced the downtowns of yesterday, and as such, the malls have taken on a public function
which resembles that of the company town of Marsh, even including streets, restaurants, hotels and churches.”);
Mulligan, supra note 33, at 539 (“Malls have also shouldered widespread community functions.”).
52

Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 79; see also Magarian, supra note 28, at 121, 124 (“Private property is often
essential for political debate because so much public interaction takes place in privately owned space, from shopping
malls to the Internet. No one advocates wholesale appropriation of private property for the sake of public discourse, but
expressive activity is a natural and appropriate byproduct of the general uses to which certain property owners—such as
shopping mall owners, media corporations that depend on advertising revenues, and Internet service providers—choose
for self-interested reasons to dedicate their property. During the campaign against international terrorism, numerous
property owners of this sort have clamped down on political debate, barring critics of government policies from
channels of expression opened by their own invitations for the public to use their property. . . . First Amendment law
has always reflected a central concern with the chilling of speech—the danger that threats or reprisals against unpopular
speakers will dissuade others from speaking their minds and challenging the status quo. The anticommunist purges that
followed the two World Wars are only the most prominent examples of how nongovernmental reprisals and
intimidation can chill political expression.”).
53

Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 87; see also Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. at ____ (“The more an owner, for
his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by
the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it. Thus, the owners of privately held bridges, ferries, turnpikes
and railroads may not operate them as freely as a farmer does his farm. Since these facilities are built and operated
primarily to benefit the public and since their operation is essentially a public function, it is subject to state
regulation.”).
54

Id. at 86. See also Christopher M. Kelly, “The Spectre of a Wired Nation”: Denver Area Telecommunications
Consortium v. FCC and First Amendment Analysis in Cyberspace, 10 HARV. J. LAW & TEC. 559, 627-28 (Summer
1997) (“Claims that the Internet is a public forum neglect one major factor that was a significant dividing line among
the Justices in Denver Area: one of the primary questions in determining whether a potential ‘place’ for speech can be a
public forum is whether it is in fact public. Privately controlled space cannot generally be deemed a forum open to
expression without some prior regulatory involvement. There are of course the hard cases of company towns and
shopping malls that make this distinction a bit more blurry. But that does not mean that there is no public/private
property distinction, especially when it comes to government action that ‘opens up’ a space for speech access. The
different approaches of the plurality, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas above indicate how characterization of the
space at issue affects the outcome. Establishing a World Wide Web site, for example, requires both the use of a portion
of cyberspace that is generally public in character—the network of networks that comprises the Internet—and one that
is generally private in character—the host computer that the individual posting the page either owns or on which she has
leased space. When another user aims to access an individual's web page, she goes through the public network to reach
the private one. Does this somehow trigger a public forum analysis?”); Alexander, supra note 10, at 44 (“Unfortunately,
the United States Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutional right to engage in expressive activity in
privately owned shopping malls. While the Court has recognized the individual states' right to extend to their citizens
greater protections under the state constitution, only a few have done so in this area. Many instead have turned a cold
shoulder to those seeking to express themselves. In this context, the promise of American democracy is being
thwarted.”).
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Beyond this, Von Hirsch and Shearing then put forth a detailed framework for regulating
SCP in mass private space.55 They distinguish between long-term/permanent exclusion and shortterm exclusion.56 Inherent in their assertions are arguments about regulation of conduct in massprivate property,57 since short or long-term exclusion is the general enforcement mechanism for not
complying with the behavioral standards set by the owner/operator.58 Von Hirsch and Shearing see
long-term/permanent exclusion from mass private space, whether based on profiling or conduct, as
problematic under almost any circumstance.59 However, they see brief conduct-related exclusion as
acceptable.60
Similarly, Gray and Gray argue against giving broad powers of exclusion to owners of mass
property, asserting that the English court decision Rawlins, holding that owners of mass private
property retain the right of arbitrary exclusion,61 was wrongly decided because the power to exclude
from mass private space, which is functionally public, should be limited to public interest
concerns.62 Likewise Duff and Marshall, “assume that the mall is or should be a public space,
providing public goods. . . .”63 Thus, they assert that SCP measures that curtail people’s freedom to

55

Id. at 88-93.

56

Id.

57

Von Hirsch & Shearing actually do not focus solely on mass private property and in fact speak in terms of public
space throughout much of their essay. However, because they view mass private property as public space for purposes
of evaluating SCP, their public space arguments are also arguments about mass private property.

58

Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 92; Wakefield, supra note 11, at 132.

59

Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 88-90.

60

Id. at 92-93.

61

See Rawlins, 2 E.G.L.R. 134H-134JJ (Eng.); Joan L. McGregor, Property Rights and Environmental Protection: Is
this Land Made for You and Me? 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 391, 427 (“For example, in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,
the owner of a shopping mall asserted that his right to exclude permitted him to stop persons from passing out
pamphlets at the mall. The state required mall owners to allow private individuals to "exercise state-protected rights of
free expression." The mall owners claimed this requirement constituted a taking under the Fourteenth Amendment, but
the court rejected the mall owner's taking argument. Having control over who enters one's house protects vital interests,
such as keeping secure private and personal space. Mall owners cannot claim those same vital interests are violated by
not being able to exclude persons, who are exercising their right to free expression, from a public mall. Merely
weighing the interests involved-namely the interest in excluding speakers from a mall and the interest in speaking in a
place where the public congregates-demonstrates that the more weighty interest is the interest in speech in a public
place. This shows we cannot, contrary to Blackstone's beliefs, maintain there is a single incident of ownership that is
essential to all property claims.”); JEROLD S. KAYDEN, PRIVATELY OWNED PUBLIC SPACE: THE NEW YORK CITY
EXPERIENCE 21 (2000) (“Furthermore, private owners who openly invite “general” members of the public to enter and
use their property might expose themselves to certain restrictions on their ability to exclude “specific” members of the
public.”).
62

Kevin Gray & Susan Francis Gray, Civil Rights, Civil Wrongs and Quasi-Public Space, 1 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 46,
49-50, 63 (1999).
63

Duff & Marshall, supra note 23, at 21, 28 n. 23; See also Mulligan, supra note 33, at 561 (“A superior rule would
hold that wherever the public is freely and openly invited to gather for no particular purpose, the space will be
considered public, and whoever owns the property will exert control as a state actor.”).
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enter mass private spaces (either by generally excluding them or ejecting them based upon
behavior) “exclude[s] them from access to goods. . . in which they should as citizens be able to
share. . . .”64 Therefore, SCP that involves limiting access or activity in mass private space is
“intrinsically inappropriate to the proper end of securing the public good of crime prevention, since
it prevents crime only by transforming, and distorting, that public good into a private good.”65
The theorists who are more favorable to exclusion and/or other SCP techniques in
shopping malls and elsewhere, also posit arguments rooted in a fixed view of the
relationship between a given property and the population who frequents the property and
live or work near it.
For example, Ronald Clarke, “[t]he person most closely associated with SCP,”66 calls for
greater use of SCP in mass private space and elsewhere67 He notes criticism that some have made
that “[t]he use of situational crime prevention results in the exclusion of so-called ‘undesirables’
(vagrants, the homeless, minorities and unemployed young people) from public places such as
shopping malls, parks and entertainment facilities.”68 Clark grudgingly acknowledges this concern
but fails to resolve the issue or seek a solution that takes account of the variability of the cost and
benefits of SCP from one property to another.69
Callies and Breemer, and Epstein, focus their respective analyses in this area on the issue of
the property owner’s right to exclude.70 These scholars are not focused particularly on the issue of
crime control. However, because the focus their articles is exclusion (perhaps the most
controversial form of SCP) from mass private space,71 the issue that is the topic of the instant article
inheres in their analsys Therefore, they do not feel compelled to question the extent to which the
relationship between a particular property and its locale should enter the analysis. Each argues that
such is a fundamental right of the private property owner, irrespective of the public characteristics
of the property.72
The above noted scholarship (as well as other analyses of the present issue), assume that the
practices that take place there are the same in quality and degree in mass private spaces across all
communities. These articles ignore the variations among communities in which various properties
are located and the implications those differences have for formulating policy as to the techniques

64

Duff & Marshall, supra note 23, at 21.

65

Id.

66

David Garland, Ideas, Institutions and Situational Crime Prevention, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON
SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION, at 9.
67

Clarke, supra note 22, at 110.

68

Id. at 104.

69

See id.

70

David L. Callies and J. David Breemer, The Right to Exclude Others From Private Property: A Fundamental
Constitutional Right, 3 WASH. U. J. OF L & POL’Y 39, 43 (2000); Epstein, supra note 2, at 24.

71

See id; Epstein, supra note 2, at 24.

72

See id.; Epstein, supra note 2, at 24.
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that the owners of such properties may employ. In contract, the present article incorporates this
relationship between a given property and the community in which it is located as paramount in
finding a workable solution to the challenge presented by the use of SCP in mass private space.
III.

Re-envisioning mass private space in its dual nature

Commentators have recognized that mass private space does not fit neatly into previous
conceptions of property.73 However, as noted in the previous section, courts and commentators
have generally tried to treat mass private property as if it were public space or as if it were purely
private property.74 Thus “English law now treats mass private space much like purely private
property [while] American law has important qualifications of that approach, relating for example
to racial discrimination.”75 While it is true that the American law has been less extreme in its
treatment of access as compared to the English approach and approaches put forth by scholars, the
approach of American legislatures and courts still does not recognize the dual nature of mass private
space. First, some laws, such as those prohibiting exclusion based upon race or gender, apply
equally to almost all properties open to the public in some sense; there are generally no statutes
geared specifically for mass private space. Second, while some court decisions have treated mass
private spaces as public spaces,76 in doing so they overlook the private nature of the property
altogether. In short, the United States approach involves a set of federal and state statues that cut
back on exclusion generally, irrespective of whether the property is in any sense mass private space
and inconsistent court decisions, some of which treat mass private spaces as public; some of which
treat the spaces as private.77
The instant article posits that mass private property is both private property and public space
in a sense that neither true (i.e. de jure) public space nor non-massforms of private property is.
Therefore, in formulating a model, both the private property interests and the public access interests
need to be taken into account—both are legitimate and the contradictions they raise, while
presenting a challenge, do not warrant ignoring one interest in favor of the other.78 Put differently,
mass private space remains private property and that fact cannot be ignored.79 However, at the
same time, traditional approaches to regulating private property (and for purposes of this article
SCP on private property) must be reexamined given the de facto public nature of the property.80
73
74

See, e.g., Mulligan, supra note___, at 539-540; Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 2, at 80.
See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 2, at 24; Singer, supra note 2, at 1291.

75

Von Hirsch, supra note 38, at 74. See also Gray & Gray, supra note 53, at 49-50, 63 (arguing that mass private space
is functionally public and should be treated as such).

76

See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590, at 25.

77

See federal Civil Rights Act of 1964; Singer, supra note 2, at 1374-75 (collecting state civil rights statutes that address
the right of access and rules against discriminating based on various factors such as race and ethnicity in places of
public accommodation).
78

Cf. Heller, supra note 21, at 418 (“Private property is a complicated idea to pin down precisely, as its boundaries
fray at the edges.”).
79

See Epstein, supra note 2, at 22; Pruneyard Shopping Center, 447 U.S. at 82-84.

80

See Mulligan, supra note 2, at 539-541.
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Despite scholarly and doctrinal debate as to whether private space should be treated as
public space for purposes of SCP, this collaquey has not further devoloped the notion of mass
private space having a dual quality. Von Hirsch’s approach is illustrative. He states:
“[T]he public character of [mass private] space and its uses would appear to warrant
regulation comparable to that appropriate for publicly-owned space with similar
functions. Underlying this view is the notion of property as constituted by a bundle
of rights held by the property owner: some of these may be restricted while
preserving others. The owner of mass [private] space thus should be entitled to
operate and seek to make a profit on it much like other private investment. But if
the facility’s use is comparable to that of public space, there should be restrictions
on practices that infringe the privacy of its users comparable to those that should be
applicable to public spaces.”81
While this description is apt, it argues that mass private space is effectively public space.82
The model proposed in the instant article, in contrast, is based upon the realization that mass private
property, despite having a public aspect, also retains facets of private property ensures that the
owner retains some rights (including the right to employ some forms of SCP, particularly exclusion
and regulation of behavior on her property), and is rooted in the “bundle of rights” paradigm.83
Similarly, the fact the property is being put to a particular public use means that the private property
rights that the owner/operator retains from the bundle will be fewer than for other forms of private
property.84
The importance of this dual public/private concept of mass private property to the
framework proposed here is as follows. The framework has both a procedural and substantive
quality. Procedurally it envisions the community (a concept to be discussed in more detail in
Sections IV and V) as the primary regulators of SCP in mass private space.85 Substantively,
however, it puts boundaries on what is the legitimate scope of regulation, both in terms of what
limits the community can impose on the property owner’s use of SCP and on what the community
may allow the owner to do.86 The dual nature of the property has implications both for these
boundaries as well as for the procedural components of my framework.
The first boundary is rooted in the concept that the space in question is in fact private
property. The fact that it is open to the public generally and therefore has a major impact on civic
81

Von Hirsch, supra note 38, at 74 (citing Kevin Gray, Property in Thin Air, 50 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 252 (1991)); see also
Mulligan, supra note 33, at 560 (“The court concluded that Robins v. Pruneyard does not require that a shopping
center's obligations vis-a-vis expressive activities completely mirror those of the government. Such a conclusion would
fly in the face of the reality that a shopping center wears two hats: one is as a center of commerce and the other is as a
public forum located on private property.”).
82

See id..

83

See Callies and Breemer, supra note ____, at 43..

84

See Pruneyard Shopping Center, 447 U.S. at 82-84.

85

See generally Lawrence W. Sherman, Public Regulation of Private Crime Prevention, 539 ANNALS 102 (1995).
Cf. Scott, supra note 43, at 432 (2006) (“One dimension of the broad community justice approach is that the systems
in which the offenders are adjudicated ought to take better account of the desires, needs, perspectives, and interests of
the community most directly affected by the offenders’ conduct.”).
86
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life, does not of itself merit the conclusion that the property owner has forfeited all property based
rights.87 Conversely, the fact that the space is privately owned does not merit treating the space as
though it were the same as non-mass private spaces and allowing the property owner to engage in
SCP measures merely because he would be allowed to do so if in fact the space in question were
purely private or open to the public for only limited purposes.88 This argument will be spelled out
in Section V.
Another aspect of the proposed framework is that although the community ought to be able
to generally decide (within the above mentioned boundaries) which SCP measures are acceptable in
mass private property to which the community has a connection,89 there are situations in which the
mechanism of representative community decision-making is suspect.90 Recognizing the dual nature
of mass private property plays two roles with regard to the issue of procedurally suspect community
decision-making. First, it may provide some indication as to when community decision-making has
run afoul of accepted norms. Second, it may provide a basis for imposing a solution when the
community has not acted properly in regulating mass private space. Section V will expand upon
this.
IV.

Situational Crime Control, Mass Private Space and Community Contingency
As discussed in Section II above, most judicial decisions and commentary concerning the
regulation of SCP on mass private property has been substantive in nature, delineating which types
of exclusion and behavior regulation in such spaces are acceptable and which are not.91 These
writings do not generally call for the community affected by such measures to play a role in
regulating SCP.
A.

What is Community?

Community is a contentious and contested term. As used in the sociological sense the term
“[c]ommunity. . .ranges across, and hence borrow meaning from spatial, temporal, kinship, ethnic,
and institutional reference points.”92 In the last twenty-five to thirty years politicians and some
academics from a wide spectrum of persuasions have used “community” as a catchall word, either
87
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See Vincent, supra note 2, at 221.
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90
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143-44; PruneYard Shopping Center, 447 U.S. 74; Rawlins, 2 E.G.L.R. 130 (Eng.)).
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Nicola Lacey & Lucia Zedner, Discourses of Community in Criminal Justice, 22 J. L. & SOC’Y 301, 302 (1995). See
also Scott, supra note 41, at 435 (“Determining what is a community and who speaks for it is more than just a semantic
exercise. To be sure, the term "community" has varied definitions: (1) a group of people living in the same locality and
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having common interests, similarity, or identity, (4) society as a whole.”).
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alone, or in connection with other words.93 Thus, one often hears or reads about “community
values,” “community penalties” and “community policing.”94 “Community” has been used in
connection with a range of social and political issues, including, for purposes of this paper, the
causes of and solutions to the problem of criminal behavior.95
Used either on its own or as part of a phrase, the word “community” is an emotive one, and
like “family,” has often been put forth as a unquestionably good thing,96 which many people,
especially those who have public exposure, are loathe to challenge.97 After all, how could any
decent person be against “strengthening the community” or challenge the need for “family values?”
And, it has an appeal for both the Left and Right on the political spectrum: after years of pessimism
that “nothing works” with regard to the crime problem, starting in the 1970s there was a new
optimism and agreement across the political spectrum that “that something can be done about crime
if it is done. . .with the support of the community.”98
For example, “community penalties” and “community policing” conjure up images of
progressing and decent ways of dealing with crime. The Left finds such rhetoric appealing as it
implies an understanding and less harsh way of dealing with criminals and victims—perhaps
bringing them together to understand each other and reach a mutually agreeable solution. The Right
takes comfort in calls for a return to “community” and for more emphasis on “community values,”
as such conjures up images of a time when decent people looked out for one another and had rigidly
defined roles; a time before there was poverty, racial tension, serious crime and ambiguously
defined gender roles and family unties. If crime, racism, homosexuality, drug and alcohol abuse
existed, it only existed in other places—it did not “openly” exist in “decent communities.” In
reality, as much recent critical scholarship has pointed out, the “community” whose loss so many
93
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cite as the source of modern day problems, from crime to divorce and economic instability, and
whose resurrection will be salvation for both the deviant and the victim of deviance, probably never
really existed in the manner and to the degree that those who invoke its name claim; and
“community” has been used so broadly in recent rhetoric that it in some sense has no fixed
meaning.99
In choosing the word “community” as an instrument for regulating SCP, this article employs
a term that can mean any number of things (or in a sense have no meaning at all). However,
although “community” is necessarily a problematic term, by sufficiently defining the manner in
which it is used here, the term has a meaning that serves the purposes of the proposed model. That
is, the instant analysis does not purport to settle the problem of finding one true meaning of
community, but rather seek a working meaning of community that is sufficient for purposes of the
argument put forth herein.
The uses of “community” can be broken down into community as an end and community as
a means to other ends.100 The present article employs the term as a means for regulating SCP in
mass private space. Moreover, this analysis uses the term community both as an instrumentality for
regulating SCP in mass private space and as a place in which such regulation takes place.101
More specifically, the structure that this article puts forth envisions a model in which
relatively local political entities play a major role in regulating SCP in mass private space located
within the community to which such political entities are accountable and is therefore flexible.102
Thus, in many cases representatives, rather than all the members who comprise the relevant
community, will take action to regulate SCP in mass private space, although, in some jurisdictions
communities may act through referendum.
Another way of understanding the argument in favor of the community as a regulator of SCP
in mass private space is to examine what should not be the primary manner of regulating SCP in
mass private space. Within some broad boundaries discussed in Section V, the types of SCP that an
owner/operator of mass private property should be allowed to employ should not be decided a
priori, with no reference to the particular property and its role in relation to the place in which it is
located and the people who would seek to use the space.103 Thus, the model here rejects the
99
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arguments in favor of a detailed, substantive framework that is meant to apply in all places.104
Moreover, regulation of SCP on mass private property should generally not be imposed from
without by distant judicial, legislative or executive agents.105
Thus, as regards SCP in mass private space, community refers to: (1) the people who (themselves or
through representation) will effect the regulation; and (2) the manner in which they will do so,
although the model leaves much leeway with regard to the latter issue. At this point, the specifics
of the community as a population and as a mechanism are still somewhat abstract. The discussion
in Section V.B., infra, will add specificity to the general framework developed in the present
subsection.
B.

SCP in Mass Private Space as Contingent upon the Relevant Community

Keeping in mind the above concept of community as both agency and location,106 this
subsection argues that SCP in mass private space is both a reflection of (and therefore contingent
upon) the relevant community. It also argues that for this and additional reasons set forth herein,
communities should be the primary regulators of SCP in mass private space. Subsection V.B. then
elaborates on the logistics of the community as primary regulator of SCP in mass private space.
Thus, the instant subsection is the “why” of community regulation of SCP, while Subsection V.B. is
the “how.”
Given that both crime and SCP take place in real communities (not in the abstract) and that a
mass private property is part of a community, the nature and degree of SCP that an owner/operator
of SCP may take will not only affect the community greatly but in a sense will be an expression of
the values of the community.107 Further, many aspects about “crime control which purport to be
universal in fact take their sense and limits of applicability from. . .cultural connections.”108
Moreover, as Garland notes: “Social groups and individuals are differently placed in respect
to crime—differently vulnerable to victimization, differently fearful about its risks, differently
oriented by values, beliefs and education in their attitudes to its causes and remedies.”109 Garland
adds:
application tailored to the particulars of the circumstance in contrast to the formulation of broader rules to be applied
across the board).
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[T]he present-day world of private-sector crime prevention exists in a reflexive
relationship to the theories and prescriptions of situational crime prevention. It is in
this interchange—between the practical recipes of the commercial sector managers
and the worked-out rationales of criminologists and government policymakers—
that one must locate the strategy or preventative partnership and the habits of
thought and action upon which it depends.110
Thus, although Garland sees the social groups as being central to crime and crime control, in
discussing SCP in the private sector, it is as if the community as it had existed has disappeared, both
in terms of what does take place and what he believes should take place.111 This is curious in that
Garland himself argues that the road to SCP in mass private property (as well as other types of latemodern crime control) lie in changes in communities.112 Yet, when he discusses the tangible
manifestations of the changes in late 20th and early 21st century, it is as if extra-community entities
have hijacked the institutions in question from the very society that make such institutions
possible.113 Most importantly for the issue with which the present paper is concerned, while he
admits that the types of changes that have taken place could not have occurred but for changes in
society itself (i.e. communities), even if politicians, the media and corporations were able to build
upon such changes, he does not look to communities as a possible regulating force for SCP.114
Thus, one of Garland’s arguments is that changes in late modernity “eventually resulted in
cultural effects.”115 Culture effects and affects the changes that have occurred.116 Most importantly
for the model presented in this paper, is the strong link that culture (and therefore community) has
with crime control. This relationship, however, is not a one-way street, and, as such, the most
appropriate source for regulating SCP in mass private space is the community.117
Similarly, Shapland notes that “the burdens and benefits of a particular technique for
preventing or controlling crime (such as SCP) fall on different parts of society.”118 She calls for
divided over what constitutes acceptable youth conduct. This is especially true in areas undergoing substantial
demographic change—for example, an influx of youth where older residents predominated, or an influx of a new ethnic
or racial group.”).
110
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“examin[ing] what SCP looks like from each perspective.”119 She thus points out that SCP might be
a net gain from the government’s perspective or from the standpoint of those who can afford
protective devices or are allowed to enter mass private spaces without much problem but a net loss
for the poor and/or excluded members of society.120
Shapland’s and Garland’s arguments point out an important issue in terms of evaluating the
benefits, costs, ethics and other consequences of SCP: these cannot be evaluated in a vacuum; one
must evaluate these from one or more perspectives.121 However, their arguments also are
illustrative of the fact that multi-perspective analyses of pros and cons of SCP in mass private
property (and elsewhere) are dependent upon the nature of the mass private space and upon the
effects of different SCP measures in various types of properties.122
As important as the above insights are, the analysis of community variability that the
literature has generally ignored is equally important. The role that a given mass private property
plays in a community will be highly dependent not only on the characteristics of the property123 but
also upon the demographics, location and other aspects of the community in which it is located as
well as upon any other communities from which it draws patrons.124 The role that such a mass
space occupies is also dependent upon crime rates in the area, whether or not alternative locations to
the mass private property exist, either in other mass private spaces or in public places as well as
other factors. Garland acknowledges, “SCP has no fixed ideological meaning or determinate fixed
political affiliations,”125 while Shapland argues that SCP does not itself contain the ethical
boundaries and constraints necessary to set acceptable limits to the choice of technique to apply,
SCP merely provides a palette of techniques.126 Thus the impact of SCP in mass private space can
be fixed only with regard to both the manner in which it is employed and also to the relationship
between a given mass private space and the community relevant to that space.127 Many scholars
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seem to be aware of these facets but do not look to them as a source for making, to paraphrase
Shapland, difficult choices.128
The meaning and impact of SCP measures employed in a given space will be both
objectively and subjectively contingent upon the communities where the space is located and upon
the ones it serves. They are likely to be objectively contingent, in the sense that the characteristics
of the community, the mass private space in question, as well as the nature of the SCP employed
will have different impacts in different communities.129 The effects are also subjectively
contingent, as the individual and collective experiences of a given community will be a partial
determinant of how members of that community experience SCP measures that an owner/operator
of mass private space employs.130
For example, consider the objective and subjective implications of excluding people under a
certain age (unless accompanied by an adult) from a shopping mall that is essentially the only
public place where most of the community’s senior citizens can go, in that many do not drive and
there is no convenient public transportation for them, but that is located in a community where there
are other choices available for young people (perhaps other mall that are too far away for many
elderly or physically challenged persons to reach given their relative immobility but which
teenagers excluded from this space could reach without great difficulty).131 Objectively and
subjectively speaking, the positive impact on the seniors and others who have limited mobility may
be quite strong while the negative impact on the excluded teenagers small. The former group may
be particularly suspect to crime and excluding youths, while painting with a broad brush, may lower
the risk of the elderly and physically challenged being victims of crime (objective) and their feeling
unsafe (subjective) while at the mall.132 And if such SCP is not employed, the seniors and those
with disabilities will have to choose between forgoing engaging in public interaction and exposing
themselves to risk and fear. The excluded group has other options (objective) and also may not feel
particularly stigmatized by their exclusion (subjective), since they are not being kept out of a space
to which their peers have access and are being kept out for the protection of the elderly, a purpose
that is arguably not a stigmatizing one for youths.
Consider a second scenario in which, as in the above example, a mall engages in a policy
whereby no one under a certain age may enter unless accompanied by an adult.133 Assume also that
this mall is in a poor neighborhood and that the youths who live in this neighborhood do not have
reasonable access to a similar facility. Assume that there are other malls located some distance
away, in wealthier neighborhoods, which are too far away for the excluded youth to reach, but that
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the young people in those neighborhoods are situated such that they can frequent these other
venues, which do not have a similar exclusionary policy.
In this case, members of the excluded group have been foreclosed from taking advantage of
the only available shopping or public interaction experience (objective) and may feel stigmatized,
knowing that their peers in wealthier districts have access to shopping malls or other facilities to
which they do not (subjective). Thus, the variability of the communities in which the mass private
spaces are located and the relationship between the spaces and the communities in the first and
second examples shows that objectively and subjectively the consequences of the exclusionary
policy will be different from the standpoint of both excluded and non-excluded/protected groups.
The above examples support the argument that one cannot derive a broad substantive
formula that will apply to a given SCP practice in a given type of mass private property that is
applicable to all communities. As Shapland describes it:
SCP is not the kind of crime reduction initiative that can be delivered top-down in a
uniform manner . . . . This means that SCP has to be usable for those implementing
it locally. It is they who need to understand the palette and its applicability to their
situation. It is also they who will work through the ethical implications of their
chosen SCP activities. 134
Therefore, given that there are so many variables, the community in which the mass private
property is located is best suited to make a determination as to what types of SCP practices are and
are not acceptable.135
There is another reason that calls for making the community the primary regulator of SCP in
mass private space. SCP involves first order issues as to what weight should be accorded certain
values.136 There is no objective answer to how much weight the safety of easily victimized
members of society (or their subjective feeling of security) should be given relative to that of the
right of access to community members that are easily marginalized.137 And for any set of variables,
there will be a number of competing values for which the correct balance admits to no
predetermined formula: the freedom of one to express himself against the interest in being able to
have a setting free from offensive conduct and speech;138 the interest of people to hang about in a
large group in a fixed area versus the interests of those who wish to walk comfortably around the
134
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space, as well as the interest of the owners of various businesses in not having the entranceways to
their shops impeded; the interest that teenagers have in having a place to go (and perhaps the
interest of their parents in their having a place to go that is safer than local neighborhood streets)
versus the desire that some adults might have in going to a place that is free from teenagers. In
addition, the interest of the owner/operator of the mass private space in creating an environment that
is in her (and her tenants’) pecuniary interest as well as one consistent with her ethical and personal
concerns139 may clash with the interest of those who wish to take advantage of the space.
Also, it as at the community level that crime and SCP manifests itself.140 While there is a
myriad of data on aggregate criminal activity, crime and the fear of such manifests itself in the
forms of discrete events affecting individuals living in a given community, and the reality and fear
of crime has become part of everyday life in many communities.141 Similarly, while the emergence
of SCP or mass private space can arguably be examined across nations or as a phenomenon of late
modernity,142 it also is something that affects individuals and communities. Some groups of people
are excluded or feel unwelcome in a particular mass private space. Just as crime has become a part
of everyday life for many people, so too has being the subject or target of SCP in mass private
space.143 This community of people is thus affected and in this sense are part of the community that
should be given a say as to the nature and extent of SCP in mass private property.
In addition, within certain bounds, discussed in Section III, supra, and in Section V, infra,
the extent and nature of SCP techniques employed in mass private space are matters that not only
are best decided by the community in question, but also are ones that are important for the
community to decide. 144 It is not just that the community is best situated to evaluate the various
concerns that are present within it, but that the community can express itself by regulating the
manner in which spaces that may be the major public place of interaction deal with people who may
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wish to enter the space as well as with how these spaces deal with the risks to and fears of those
who it invites to enter.145
In that a community by definition expresses itself by its manner of punishment, so too does
it express itself by where it draws the line between safety levels and degrees of freedom and
between property rights and access rights.146 This argument treads closely to discussing mass
private space as though it were public space. However, there is a key distinction. Under the
proposal put forth herein, communities and/or their representatives would not directly regulate
conduct. Rather they would be giving more or less leeway to the owner of private property to
regulate conduct solely on the property in question based upon the particular circumstances of the
community and its ethics and values. Additionally, the boundaries, alluded in Section III, above,
and detailed in Section V, below, distinguish my model from one that treats mass private property
as purely public space.
The community role in regulating SCP on mass private property is narrower in some sense
and broader than others than direct community and/or the state regulation of public spaces. It is
narrower for the reasons that as discussed in Section III, above, and V, below, that a mass private
property owner/operator may (and ought to) be given more leeway to control access and activity in
her space than the government may on public property. It is broader in the sense that the
community is only putting limits (and the limits it may impose are bounded) on what the mass
private property owner/operator may do vis-à-vis his or her space (but will inevitably be giving the
property owner leeway since he or she may do less than the community allows or more than the
community requires), not regulating the conduct itself. And it is qualitatively different since the
community is acting directly only upon the SCP measures that the owner/operator might apply in
the mass space, not upon the patrons themselves, as it would be in regulating conduct in public
spaces.
V.
Creating a Framework for Regulating SCP in Mass Private Property in Terms of its
Dualistic Nature, its Role in the Community and Community Values
Having argued in previous sections that regulation of SCP in mass private property involves
taking account of both the fact that the property is privately owned and also is put to use much as
public property is, and also that such regulation should be undertaken by the community, in this
section the article spells out a framework for such regulation that takes account of these aspects of
mass private property and SCP. Moreover, in addition to substantive differences that argue in favor
of different communities having the power to regulate the substance of SCP that owners of mass
private property may employ, there is also a procedural variability from place to place. That is,
different communities may wish to have not only different substantive standards of permissible SCP
but also wish to have different procedural mechanisms about the way they formulate such standards.
Despite this variability and flexibility, the model presented can provide a broad framework as to the
role of and the limits upon community involvement. This framework has three categories: (1)
boundaries; (2) scope of relevant populations; and (3) mechanisms.

145

See id.

146

In referring to the expressive use of punishment, I do not mean in the sense that the community affirmatively takes
steps to punish with the purpose of expressing itself. Rather, I am putting forth the view that when society punishes,
whatever the impetus for such, that it inevitably expresses itself. Durkheim, supra note 9, at 79-80.
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A.

Boundaries

As used here, boundaries provide upper and lower limits on what communities may allow or
forbid regarding SCP in mass private property. This is one way in which mass private property’s
dual public/private nature is important.
1.

Existing Boundaries

The United States Supreme Court has essentially delegated the power to rule on the right to
exclude (and employ other forms of SCP) from mass private space to Congress and to states.147 As
such, in the US, regulation of SCP has taken place in the form of federal regulation such as the 1964
civil rights act as well as through state court rulings and state legislation.148 While this creates
variation among jurisdictions “[t]he message of the contemporary American cases, although as yet
far from uniform, thus suggests a resurgence of concern that the territorial control of large-scale
private owners should not be permitted to overreach the essential liberties of the citizen.”149
2.

Envisioning Boundaries

There should be both substantive and procedural limits on what measures a community
should allow and what limits it may impose vis-à-vis SCP in mass private property. This subsection
provides a framework for substantive limits or boundaries.150 Procedural limitations inhere in the
discussion in subsequent subsections of the role that communities should play in being the primary
arbiters of SCP in mass private property.
The substantive boundaries are rooted in the dual nature of mass private space as both public
and private property.151 As private property, there are certain rights that the owner retains
147
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irrespective of the fact that she has opened the space to general public use.152 Unlike public
property, the owner has made an investment in the property and also has a personal stake.153 As
such, the community should not be allowed to so limit what measures the owner of the property
may undertake that the property ceases to resemble property.154
On the other hand, as a space open to the public for general use, there are certain forms of
SCP that are inherently inconsistent with the property’s being put to such use.155 These limitations
will not be the same as that which would apply were the property truly public, where the issue
would concern unacceptable government coercion. Rather, while drawing to some degree on the
fact that mass private space resembles public property, the central guiding principle in setting up a
substantive boundary on unacceptable SCP is that the practices cannot be inconsistent with a facility
to which the entire community and beyond (the entire world in fact) is invited to enter.
The model put forth here does not seek to formulate a detailed reservoir of property rights
that an owner of mass private property retains so as to delineate which controls on SCP are within
communities’ purviews. Nonetheless, the fact that a property owner opens his premises to general
public use does not, as many theorists have argued, turn private property into public property; under
the model, the owner retains some portion of the bundle of rights associated with private property,
even if the public is generally invited to enter for no particular purpose.156 Conversely, because this
invitation to the public gives mass private space certain characteristics and functions akin to those
of public property, the bundle or rights that the owner retains is markedly different and necessarily
smaller than those retained even by the owner of private property that is open to the public for a
particular use, such as a restaurant.157
The concept of private property has played a long and important role in the legal history of
the United States.158 At the same time, modern court cases and commentary recognize that private
property should not trump social justice, fairness and equal opportunity and access while
conceptions of what limits can be put on an individual’s use of his or her property may change as
new forms of property exist, this calls only for an ongoing re-evaluation of the property and
constitutional rights of owners of less traditional forms of property, not for the jettisoning of the
concept of private property once it is put to a particular use.159 Moreover, treating mass private
property as public property has severe fairness and economic consequences.160 Those who have
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invested in private property would effectively lose their investment; those who might wish to invest
in mass private property might be stripped of their incentive to do so.161 Thus, although the model
presented here envisions mass private property as qualitatively different from other types of private
property, the dual public/private quality inherent in the model allows traditional property law to
serve as a beacon, even if not as an exact marker, in setting the boundary on a community’s right to
limit SCP.
The traditional view that inherent in the concept of private property is the right to exclude
does play a role in setting some boundary upon the limits that communities can impose on SCP
measures that owner/operators may employ.162 On the other end are boundaries on what SCP
exclusion and behavioral standard the community may allow the owner of mass private space to
impose. This boundary is rooted in the fact that the property is so public in nature.163 So, not only
may an owner/operator not be given authority to exclude based upon race, religion or nationality
(bases that would be illegitimate even with private property open to the public only for a specific
use), but arguably the owner/operator should not be able to exclude groups generally afforded less
protection than those just listed, such as teenagers or the homeless, without at least providing a
sound basis for doing so.164
These bases are illustrative, not comprehensive and it is not possible to enumerate all the
bases for exclusion that fall beyond this boundary. What is important to note is that such a
boundary clearly exists but given the broad range that the model proposes in terms of community
regulation the territory that this boundary demarcates (just as that which the other boundary,
limiting community incursion onto a mass private space owner’s property rights) is quite limited;
the bulk of the substance of what SCP measures an owner/operator may employ should be in the
province of community regulation.
Moreover, even the boundaries are somewhat contingent, but the important difference is
that, unlike the range of choices within the boundaries, the boundaries themselves should not be left
to the political choice of communities. They are properly the province of constitutional and
common law court decisions (or perhaps broader political choice, such as the nation, state or
county, as opposed to the village, town or city level). The precise boundary against incursion into
property rights cannot be delineated in the abstract. The important point for my analysis is that such
a boundary does exist and that it clearly falls somewhere outside allowing the community to impose
limits on the property owner’s ability to use SCP that would be valid only if the mass private
property were treated as public property—notwithstanding its general openness to the public, mass
private property ought to be treated as a form of private property and this limits the restrictions that
the community may place on the property owner’s use of SCP.
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B.

Scope of Relevant Populations

To this point, this article has dealt with community without addressing the problem of
defining the contours of the community that is to take part in regulating a particular mass private
space. While actual location of mass private property provides a starting point for defining the
relevant community that should regulate SCP on such property, it does not end the inquiry.
There is no exact demarcation of the bounds of community that applies in all
circumstances.165 Rather, there are two primary criteria by which to evaluate scopes of
communities: geographic and demographic.166 A key necessity for the validity of my argument is
that the relevant geographic and demographic communities that are affected by SCP on mass
private property are represented in the decision making process for implementing regulation of SCP
within the outer bounds of appropriate community regulation.167 Only if the affected communities,
viewed from both of these aspects, have a place at the table, will it be possible for regulation of SCP
to take account of the costs and benefits that SCP measures will have on the affected population. 168
Moreover, only if such representation occurs will regulation of SCP serve the further step of
expressing and reinforcing the views, preferences, ethics and mores of the relevant communities.
1.

Geographic Community

A mass private space is located in a particular city, town and village will likely serve people
from adjacent and even non-adjacent municipalities.169 Therefore, simply nominating the governing
unit wherein the property is located as the relevant community will not satisfy the geographic
component of my analysis. Rather, all those whom SCP in mass private space is likely to affect
should be party to formulating regulations.170
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The above issue raises two subsidiary ones: (1) how to determine the geographic dimensions
of the relevant community; (2) once the first determination is made, constructing a mechanism that
effects the proper representation. There is no exact relevant community.171 There will be no way to
determine precisely the location of the populace who wishes to frequent a particular mass private
property.172 Also, the question of how many users of a mass private space need come from a given
community (or what percentage of that community need use the mass private space) in order for the
community to be deemed sufficiently important vis-à-vis the space in order to be part of the
decision making process does not lend itself to a precise numerical answer.173
Certainly usage of mass private space does not have to be undertaken by anything close to
100% of a community in order for that community to be relevant, since such a standard would
effectively rule out all communities, including the one in which the property is located.174
Conversely, the fact that a small percentage or number from a given community might wish access
to the mass private property, is not sufficient for such community to have a say in regulation under
my model, as this will likely include such a broad swath that the result would swallow the concept
of a communitarian model of SCP regulation.175
Nonetheless, to say that a precise answer cannot be provided in the abstract is not to admit
that no meaningful analysis of the relevant geographic community can be undertaken.176 Although
it is not possible to gage exactly how many or what percentage of people from a given community
use a given mass private property, reasonable estimates can be made through surveys at mass
private spaces as well as within the communities themselves.
Deciding how much a given community need use a mass private space in order to be given a
say in regulating SCP thereon is essentially a first-order policy question not something for which
there is a precise answer, such as 30%.177 Other than saying that the guiding principle should be
whether a given community has a significant stake in SCP policies in a given mass private property
(an admittedly slippery formulation), any policy that this article advocated would necessarily be a
matter of the author’s opinion as opposed to an answer that would help policy makers make a
choice.
Two additional points are in order. First, the instant proposal is put forth as a starting point
for further academic analysis and policy implementation not as a final package. As such, if policy
makers do adopt the approach herein advocated that over time the question of whether a community
should or should not be included will become a workable, even if always a contested, matter.
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Second, the community wherein the mass private property is located should not decide
which communities should be allowed input into regulation of SCP in such space.178 There is
obviously a conflict of interest since allowing other communities to take part will necessarily dilute
the input of the community in question. It would be equivalent to allowing voters to decide who
else is eligible to vote in an election. Instead, just as boundaries need to be demarcated by some
authority outside the community, so too must the question of community participation be decided at
a broader level than the community itself, either legislatively or by judicial decree.
2.

Demographic Community

In some ways delineating demographic community is more problematic than geographic
community, or at least more controversial. Much of the commentary criticizing SCP exclusions
from mass private space points to the fact that the most marginalized groups are the most likely to
be targets of SCP.179 However, identifying and including marginalized groups will be an easier task
than delineating relevant geographic communities.
Groups such as racial and ethnic minorities and the poor, assuming they are part of the
geographic community, will by definition be included in any mechanism by which a community
would make decisions regulating SCP on mass private space, whether it be legislatively or by
referendum. That is to say, it is unlikely that anyone would put forth an argument (and if they did it
would fall on deaf ears) that minorities or those earning less than a certain amount per year cannot
take part in decisions based on such status.180 Beyond this, however, there is surely an issue as to
whether these groups may not have sufficient representation either with regard to a direct
referendum or in terms of electoral politics for their concerns to be heard.181 This is an issue I
address in the next subsection. Also, there are some groups that will fall in the geographic
community who may face resistance to their inclusion in direct community decision-making or to
their choosing community representatives.182 The groups that stand out in this regard are the
homeless and/or vagrants, persons with criminal records and youths.183 SCP may particularly target
these groups.184
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It is admittedly a concern that those under a certain age neither have the right to vote nor to
take part in community meetings and those who are without established addresses may be de facto,
even if not de jure, disenfranchised. Also, those who have criminal records, also a frequent target
of SCP,185 may also not have voting privileges, depending upon the jurisdiction and the crimes for
which they have been convicted.
The above concerns are certainly issues with which those who might wish to take my
analysis further will have to grapple if attempts to implement the proposed approach are undertaken.
However, the problems about lack of representation of the groups just mentioned are not particular
to SCP (it is true for any issue, some of which may affect such groups more severely than SCP
measures in mass private space).186 It may be that in cases the question of lack of proper
representation will require politically insulated bodies to intervene (as discussed in the next
subsection). However, depending upon the circumstances, the interests of these persons may be
protected by others as they have been with regard to issues other than SCP and mass private space.
Parents certainly have a direct interest in the options open to their children. Various groups
advocate on the behalf of criminals, ex-cons and the homeless. Moreover, communities may look
beyond narrow self-interest in setting policies, in that “people may. . .want to. . .act fairly. . .and to
be seen as acting fairly. . .[and] may sacrifice their. . .self interest in order to [do so]. . . .”187 The
extent to which communities will take these interests into account will probably vary from
community to community. My expectation is that my approach will require some intervention, but
not exclusive control, by extra-community decision-makers, whether these are courts or political
actors that are beholden to a wider constituency.
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C.
Evaluating the Validity of Community Decision Making and Remedying the Process
When Necessary
This article has set forth a primarily procedural solution to what scholars and policy makers
have generally tackled as a substantive problem.188 The framework does include substantive
dimensions, in terms of boundaries as well as mechanisms for defining the relevant community.189
Beyond this, although the analysis has pointed to the problem of defining community, the issue of
what amounts to legitimate community decision-making remains to be evaluated. This harkens back
to the procedural issue referenced in Section IV and also addresses matters alluded to in the
preceding subsection regarding the concern that even if technically allowed to participate in
decision-making, certain populations in the community affected by SCP on mass private property
may not be effectively represented. This may occur with SCP on mass private property as well as
with regard to any issue that affects under-represented groups since “[n]o matter how open the
process, those with the most votes are in a position to rate themselves advantages at the expense of
others, or otherwise refuse to take their interest into account.”190
As mentioned above, the fact that a given group is under-represented does not necessarily
mean that its interests will be ignored. This is not only an important fact in itself, but also a prelude
to determining when deliberative community decisions may disregard legitimate interests of
marginalized groups. There are two reasons that seemingly under represented groups’ interests will
be protected.
First, even if one were to assume that the members of the relevant community will act in
pure self-interest, it is possible that a plurality or even majority may agree on a policy that favors a
minority group. 191 This is because it may be the case that people having different underlying
beliefs or higher order preferences may agree on a lower level outcome because this outcome is
consistent with the higher order preference of each group.192 An example of this phenomenon
(what Sunstein refers to as incompletely theorized agreements)193 from outside criminology is two
people agreeing that some form of elective abortion should be legal, where one person reaches this
outcome because he believes that a woman’s right to reproductive choice is a fundamental aspect of
a free society while the other person does not believe this but concludes that if made illegal,
abortion would still take place at the same rate on the black market, thereby not reducing the
number of abortions while increasing the risk to woman undergoing the procedure. An example
from the mass private property/SCP field involves those under eighteen who may wish access to a
given mass private space. Their parents may wish that they have access, since they may see this as
a good social outlet and a safe setting. Store owners as well as other members of the community
188
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may conclude that excluding people based upon their age is bad for the community because it
excludes a portion of the population that will spend money within the community and if excluded,
will spend the money outside the community (to the detriment of merchants and others in the
community that may reap tax revenue or simply a stronger economy in the community from the
purchases of this under represented group).194 Thus, although those under eighteen may have no
direct say in the decision-making process and their parents may not be a large enough group to
protect their interests, their interest in access may ultimately be protected due to the agreement on
outcome by different groups motivated to reach that outcome for different reasons.
Second, recent studies have shown that even when acting in their self-interest as economic
maximizers, what individuals view in their self-interest or that from which they get utility is not
necessarily narrowly defined. 195 Thus, “people, in their capacity as political actors may attempt to
satisfy altruistic or other-regarding desires which diverge from self-interested preferences. . . .” 196
Thus, to some degree people get utility out of actions or supporting policies that benefit others and
not taking actions or opposing policies that harm others.197 The extent of this obviously varies from
person to person and from issue to issue. Thus, some people may donate a large percentage of their
income to charity while others will not. In the field of both civil rights and criminal justice, the fact
that popularly elected governments have implemented policies that put limitations on punishment or
protect certain groups from discrimination is an example of this.
The US (as well as the UK and some other countries) certainly have become more punitive
in the last several decades and more willing to implement SCP policies that fall most harshly on
marginalized groups.198 Moreover, there is no way to measure the exact amount of utility
maximization present in a society that goes beyond pure self interest, in general or with regard to
SCP on mass private property. However, these points demonstrate that one cannot simply rebut the
call for community regulation of SCP on mass private property by pointing out that in any
community there are groups that are in the minority that will be harmed by policies implemented by
the majority.199
With the above in mind, the issue becomes to what extent within the boundaries discussed
above should a community, as defined it herin, be the sole arbiter of what SCP measures may be
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taken by an owner/operator of mass private space.200 The model presented here posits that under
ideal conditions, members or representatives of the community should formulate such regulation.
However, as previously alluded, communities and/or their representatives will not always function
properly or fairly.201
This raises two issues: determining when the community falls short of being an ideal arbiter
and what to do when it does so. In terms of not functioning ideally, this model looks at this as a
procedural issue, rooted in the concepts with which this section opened.202 That is to say, the power
structure of the community may be such that some groups are simply harmed based on power
differential combined with the self-interest of a majority or concentrated minority.203 And as
mentioned in Section III, one of the guideposts for this portion of the analysis is examining the dual
aspects of mass private space as private property and also as a facility generally open to the public
in a manner that other private property is not.204
To be clear on this point, to conclude that a decision of a community harms some while
benefiting others based upon differences in preferences is not sufficient to say that the community
decision-making mechanism is not functioning properly.205 To so conclude would be to cast
aspersion on any policy implemented in a democratic state. Also, it is important to keep in mind
that the playing field at this point is only that which is between the boundaries established above.
Thus, at this stage one need not be concerned with policies that no matter how popular violate
fundamental principles such as that one should not be denied access to a mass private space based
upon his race. Rather, the problem must be within the mechanism itself, not in the ultimate
outcome.206 One may look at the outcome as evidence of mechanistic dysfunction.207 But the
outcome itself cannot be the sole reason for taking steps to override community preference.
The concept of illegitimate community decision-making is thus a somewhat elusive concept,
although Ely’s seminal work on policing the political process provides a point of reference.208 The
key is that however desirable community decision-making is with regard to SCP in mass private
property, it is only desirable to the extent that the community acts in a fair manner. The
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determination of such cannot be based simply on undesirable results but rather must be rooted in a
process that does not allow full and fair participation of interested parties.209
If within boundaries the community decision-making process is not properly functioning,
then it is necessary to have recourse to remedial measures. Once again, there is a single correct
solution to this problem that will work in all cases; there are several possibilities. One approach is
for courts to impose their own substantive standards.210 A second possibility is to bring the
decision-making process to a broader and higher democratically accountable body. This might
mean formulating legislation at the county, state or national level (as opposed to at the village, town
or city level). An example of this is American federal civil rights legislation, in which the federal
government imposed limits on racial discrimination by privately owned places of accommodation
(such as hotels) due to the failure of many states to do so.211
A third possibility, most associated with Ely, is for courts to intervene, not to impose their
own substantive standards, but to “police the process or representation.”212 Under this approach,
which Ely asserts is the basis behind much important American Supreme Court jurisprudence,
courts imposes “procedural protections. . .[that ensure] in the making of substantive choices the
decision process will be open to all on something approaching an equal basis, with the decisionmakers held to a duty to take into account all those who their decisions affect.”213 Ideally, this is the
best approach if it can be implemented successfully, because, although it involves court
intervention, ultimately substantive decisions are made by democratic actors comprised of members
or representatives of the community. At the same time, this approach is the most ambitious one put
forth here.
Regarding the other two approaches, each has advantages and disadvantages vis-à-vis
community regulation of SCP. The first has the advantage of being able to seek the best substantive
results in that decisions are made by politically insulated actors.214 But this is also its biggest
disadvantage in terms of the model put forth here because decisions are being made that affect the
community by actors that are neither part of the community nor representative of it.215
The second possibility is a compromise. Although the decision-making is taking place by
politically accountable representatives, some, but not all, of these actors will not be members or
representatives of the community in question. However, this latter disadvantage is the very reason
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why this option is a possibility.216 It is only when actors who are directly accountable to the
community act in a manner that is unfair that these three options are considered. As such, actors
who are politically accountable to a broader base than the community itself may serve to balance
out the partisanship that leads to unacceptable results in cases in which decisions on the communitylevel operate unfairly.
Conclusion
The proposed model accomplishes two things. First, by recognizing that mass private
property is highly location specific, it avoids a one size fits all solution that is implicit in much
scholarship on SCP and mass private space. Second, by asserting the primacy of the community, it
provides a framework for reinforcing community participation in formulating fundamental policy.
The framework does put some boundaries on community preferences. Outer boundaries are rooted
in property law and in the public character of the property. Also, the model provides for alternative
mechanisms for when the community does not act in a procedurally fair model.
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